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The election of Almaz Atanbaev as president of Kyrgyzstan in what has been recognized by 
western observer groups and governments as a relatively free election has been generally viewed 
as a sign that democracy may have a future in Kyrygzstan.  Atanbaev’s election also provides 
another example of how the spread of democracy and the short term goals of the U.S. are often in 
conflict. 
 
Within days of winning the election with 63 percent of the vote beating his closest rival, 
Adukhan Madumarov, by a margin of more than four to one, Atanbaev announced that he would 
soon begin to phase out the U.S. use of the air force base at Manas.  This base, located only a 
few kilometers from downtown Bishkek plays a central role in bringing supplies and troops to 
Afghanistan.  Indeed, it is hard to imagine how the U.S. effort in Afghanistan could succeed, or 
even continue, without access to the Manas base. 
 
In summer of 2009, a previous Kyrgyz president, Kurmanbek Bakiev, also sought to end U.S. 
use of Manas.  Bakiev, a deeply corrupt leader, was essentially trying to shake down the U.S. for 
more money as he was threatening to turn the base over to Russia because Russia had made a 
better offer.  Ultimately, with few good options open, the U.S. acceded to Bakiev’s shakedown 
and renegotiated their lease on Manas to the tune of $60 million per year which represented a 
substantial increase from the existing lease which had been for $17 million per year. 
 
The situation today is different.  Atanbaev’s position does not appear to be a case of simply 
trying to line his pockets with more American money, but has expressed his view based on his 
country’s geographical and strategic proximity to Russia and a fear that having a U.S. air force 
base just outside of his country’s capital could create security concerns for Kyrgyzstan.  While 
this position is not what the U.S. wants to hear, it is also reasonable and can plausibly said to be 
representing the interests of the Kyrgyz people. 
 
The U.S. is in a difficult, but not impossible, position of having to find a way to, at least in the 
short term, to continue access to Manas while avoiding undermining the vulnerable democratic 
aspirations and exprssions of the Kyrgyz people which Atanbaev represents.  The U.S. must 
work with Atanbaev respectfully, avoiding threats and avoiding overpaying for access.  Of 
course, if the Obama administration is serious about winding down the war in Afghanistan this 
task will be easier.  A solution that allows both sides to claim some kind of victory, through a 
timeline or other similar commitments, and which offers some assistance to Kyrgyzstan is a 
plausible outcome to this conundrum. 
 
The significance of this issue goes well beyond Kyrgyzstan because it is likely that in the next 
months and years there will be more newly elected governments, largely in the Middle East and 
North Africa that upon taking office will want to reframe their foreign policy and their 
relationship with the U.S.  Manas will not be the only base that will be endangered and the U.S. 
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effort in Aghanistan will not be the only military goal that is threatened by the outcomes of these 
elections. 
 
This dynamic has been a central tension of U.S. democracy assistance for much of the last 
decade, but it has become more significant following the Arab Spring.  Free elections, 
particularly in Muslim countries, often lead to governments that are less supportive of the U.S. 
and its foreign policy. If the U.S. resolves this dilemma in Kyrgyzstan without resorting to 
threats or conceding too much money, it will be a good sign, but if the U.S. cannot work with 
Atanbaev in Kyrgyzstan, prospects for resolving similar problems in North Africa will not be 
good. 
